NFC Security Solution for Web Applications by Kiiver, Jonas
 UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
FACULTY OF MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE 
Institute of Computer Science 
Software Engineering Curriculum 
Jonas Kiiver 
NFC Security Solution for Web Applications 
Master’s Thesis (30 ECTS) 
Supervisor: Professor Eero Vainikko 
 
  
Tartu 2015 
 
 
2 
NFC Security Solution for Web Applications 
Abstract: 
This thesis compares existing and possible security solutions for web applications, anal-
yses NFC compatibility for security solutions and proposes a new NFC authentication and 
signing solution using Google Cloud Messaging service and NFC Java Card. This new 
proposed solution enables authentication and signing via NFC enabled mobile phone and 
NFC Java Card without any additional readers or efforts to be made. This smart card solu-
tion can be used within multiple applications and gives the possibility to use same authen-
tication solution within different applications. 
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NFC Turvalahendus Veebirakendustele 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Töö eesmärgiks on võrrelda erinevaid eksisteerivaid veebirakenduste turvalahendusi, 
analüüsida NFC sobivust turvalahenduste loomiseks ning pakkuda välja uus NFC 
autentimise ja signeerimise lahendus läbi Google Cloud Messaging teenuse ja NFC Java 
Card’i. Autori pakutud lahendus võimaldab kasutajal ennast autentida ja signeerida läbi 
NFC mobiiliseadme ja NFC Java Card’i, nõudmata kasutajalt eraldi kaardilugejat. Antud 
lahendust on võimalik kasutada kui ühtset kasutajatuvastamise viisi erinevatele 
rakendustele, ilma lisaarenduseta. 
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1 Introduction 
As online security is becoming part of our everyday life and people are more aware of the 
different threats, there is always a need for better and innovative security solutions 
resistant to hacking and identity theft. There are multiple different solutions using a 
mobile device as an authentication endpoint, but what happens, when mobile is the actual 
means of internet access? Mobile is becoming the main internet access point for a large 
amount of people and at the moment there is no good solution to secure your mobile 
connection and to double-authenticate yourself without mobile being the second layer of 
authentication endpoint. What should be done to improve the authentication via mobile 
devices and how can secure authentication be enabled within a mobile device, using it as 
the only entry point?  
 
Commonly used authentication solutions involve a mobile device as an authentication 
endpoint by communicating with it via some third party channel like cellular network, 
image recognition software or internet. There are multiple different authentication 
solutions out there, many of them are using NFC [24] for additional authentication, but all 
of them are using NFC simply to read the unique card ID or to emulate the mobile device 
into being an NFC card - by doing that, they enable a second level of authentication with 
only one “something user has” token and do not provide an additional level of 
authentication and are lacking security. 
 
Therefore there is a need for a security solution that meets the following needs: 
a) Enables two-factor authentication for mobile devices – Additional means of 
authentication while using only mobile device as access point. 
b) Add another physical layer to the authentication process – Another “what user has” 
token within authentication flow. 
c) Resistant to internal attacks – solution must not be internally attackable, if device 
is compromised. 
d) One solution for all – one solution usable within multiple different applications and 
implementable with ease, requiring the user to remember less. 
e) Secure storage – Securely store user certificates and private keys. 
 
In order to provide a solution matching those needs, this thesis compares different existing 
solutions to find pros and cons within these solutions and examines the level of security 
existing in commonly used means of authentication. In order to improve the field of 
security solutions, author proposes his own secure authentication solution for web 
applications involving NFC, GCM [18], Android mobile phone and web application 
server. To prove the validity of NFC as security endpoint, an analysis of NFC security and 
possible attack vectors were made. Based on this analysis, a decision was made, if NFC 
and the communication between two NFC devices (NFC Java Card and NFC mobile 
device) is secure enough to host authentication solution for high security risk web 
applications.  
 
The solution proposed by author (shown in Figure 1) consists of a workstation, a mobile 
device and a NFC enabled Java Card. The workstation is a regular user computer running 
any operating system with the capability to access a web browser. The mobile device must 
be a device with NFC communication capabilities and smart card must be a Java Card 
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with NFC interface. By using only those components author proposes a new authentication 
functionality, that provides a second level of authentication via NFC card using a mobile 
device as a card reader, also authenticating mobile device within the authentication 
process. Additionally, the author is proposing solution providing the functionality to sign 
different user tasks and actions inside the web application via the same solution used for 
authentication. Signing is done by additional passphrase requested from the user and is 
separated from the authentication flow.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed NFC solution concept. 
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2 NFC security solution analysis 
2.1 NFC 
NFC (Near Field Communication) is radio frequency based communication between dif-
ferent NFC enabled devices or smart cards. Connection between endpoints can be estab-
lished by touching two devices together or bringing them into proximity (distance of 20 
cm or less)[28]. Connection is established via electromagnetic induction between two loop 
inductor antennas and it operates on ISM Band 13.56 MHz radio frequency, having trans-
fer rates between 106 Kbit/s and 424 Kbit/s [15].  
There are two different endpoint modes in NFC communication - Active or Passive. Ac-
tive modes use Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) to send the data [6]. Meaning RF signal is 
modulated with data according to coding scheme. If transfer rate is 106 KBaud, then Mil-
ler encoding scheme [42] is used and if transfer rate is bigger than 106 KBaud then Man-
chester encoding scheme [41] is used. Both of those coding schemes send one data bit in 
given time slot. The time slot is divided into two separate halves, as half bits.  
 
a) In Miller encoding [6] - 0 is encoded with delay into first half and 0 with no delay 
is encoded into second half bit. 1 is encoded with no delay into first half and 1 is 
encoded with delay into second half. 
b) In Manchester encoding [6] - the encoding is done similar to the Miller coding, but 
instead of having pause in either half bit, a whole half bit is either modulated or a 
pause.  
c) Modified Miller encoding [6] - additional rules are used for encoding zeros. If 1 is 
followed by 0, the two following half bits will have a pause, but in modified Miller 
encoding, the following two half bits are encoded without a pause. 
 
Communication speed also determines the strength of the modulation. For 106 KBaud rate 
transfer, the modulation is 100% - meaning the pause in RF signal is actually 0, but for 
transfer rates greater than 106 KBaud 10% modulation ratio is used. Using 10% modula-
tion ratio means that a pause in RF signal is not actually 0, but it is around 82% of the non-
paused signal strength. This discrepancy in the modulation strength is key aspect of securi-
ty flaws in NFC communication and this is further analyzed in section 2.3. In passive 
mode, the communication data is encoded using weak modulation, and Manchester encod-
ing with 10% modulation strength is always used.  
 
 
Figure 2. NFC communication core. 
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NFC Devices 
There are 3 types of NFC devices [6]: 
a. Active devices working as NFC readers - Devices use external power to power 
NFC electromagnetic field, sharing power with NFC tags, powering them up and 
communicating with them. 
b. Passive devices working as NFC tags - NFC tag solutions with no external power 
supply. They are started when entering into NFC electromagnetic field and their 
process lifecycle is equal to the duration of staying in the electromagnetic field. 
c. Active/Passive devices – These devices have the ability to be both an active NFC 
reader and a passive NFC. 
Using previously described types of NFC devices, there are three different communication 
configurations possible between two NFC enabled devices described in Table 1. 
Additional to the active/passive modes of NFC devices, there are also two possible roles a 
device can play in NFC communication. 
a) Initiator - A device that initiates NFC communication between two devices 
b) Target - A device that receives a communication request and responds to it 
 
As NFC communication is based on message and reply concept. Therefore, if we have an 
active device A and a passive device B, then A is able to start the communication and re-
ceive responses from device B, but device B is not able to start the communication itself 
and can only reply to requests made by device A. The possible combinations of an NFC 
device’s roles and modes are described in Table 2. 
Table 1.  NFC communication configurations. 
Device A Device B Description 
Active Active Describing NFC peer-to-peer solution as the data sending device gen-
erates an RF field and acts as an active device and the data receiving 
device acts as a passive device. When device A sends data, device B is 
passive, and when device B sends data, device A is passive. 
Passive Active Device B is acting as a passive device and device A is generating an 
RF field and is active. 
Active Passive Device A is an active device and device B is passive 
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In addition, it should be mentioned, that NFC communication is not limited to paired de-
vices and one initiator can communicate with multiple devices at the same time. This 
means the NFC communication is started simultaneously, but the sending device must 
select the device the message is meant for and other devices must ignore the sent message, 
therefore the actual communication between devices is still one-to-one. 
2.2 NFC connection security 
As NFC communication is established without any physical restrictions, the communica-
tion between devices is open to the public, exposing it to multiple threats. NFC communi-
cation can be disrupted by corrupting the data, listening to it or replacing data while trans-
ferring.  
Eavesdropping 
As NFC is a wireless technology, then it is certain that eavesdropping can be an easy secu-
rity breach as devices communicating via NFC use RF waves to talk to each other. Attack-
er can use an antenna to also receive the communication sent between the devices and with 
sufficient knowledge of RF waves and how data is coded into them, the attacker can ex-
tract communication data from the received communication. The equipment needed to do 
such eavesdropping must be assumed to be available to an attacker, as equipment needed 
to create such an attack is publicly available to everyone and no special equipment is 
needed. As NFC communication is claimed to work only within 20 cm or less proximity 
between devices, a question arises: how close must the attacker be to the communicating 
devices to extract readable data from the received RF waves? This question cannot be an-
swered with full accuracy, as there are multiple parameters that affect the distance of ex-
tracting readable data from RF waves. Parameters that affect the range of NFC radio fre-
quency waves are [6]: 
 
a) Power sent out by the NFC device - The amount of power used to send RF waves 
affect the range of RF waves, as more power produces wider range, exposing the 
device more for attacks 
b) Location - RF waves travel differently in different environments.( e.g. metal walls, 
underground etc.) 
c) NFC characteristics of sender device - RF wave range depends greatly on the send-
ing phone RF characteristics (e.g. antenna size and geometry, mobile case shield-
ing effect etc.)  
d) Quality of the attackers devices - Distance between the attacker and the communi-
cation NFC devices depend vastly on the quality of the attackers devices (antenna 
size and geometry, RF signal decoder, receiver) 
 
Due to those parameters, an exact distance of RF waves in NFC communication can not be 
given and if the distance is given, then it can  only be correct for a given set of parameters 
and not for all possible parameter values [28].  
Table 2.  NFC communication configurations based on initiator and target. 
 Initiator Target 
Active device Possible Possible 
Passive device Not Possible Possible 
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Additionally, there is a huge difference in what mode the sender is operating. If the data 
sender is operating in passive mode, then the senders RF field is powered by the other par-
ty of this communication and the fields distance is much smaller than the RF field distance 
on the active sender, making it much harder to eavesdrop information sent by the passive 
sender. Touch estimate on how big can the distance be to successfully eavesdrop NFC 
communication is about 10 m for active devices and 1 m for passive devices [6]. 
 
As NFC is a wireless technology, it can not protect itself against eavesdropping. Even if 
data transmitted in passive mode is harder to eavesdrop on, it is not sufficient to ignore the 
threat. Therefore, the only real solution against eavesdropping is to create a secure channel 
connection with software. This solution is further described in section 2.2.3. 
Data Corruption 
Additional to the eavesdropping discussed in section 2.2.1.1, an attacker can also try to 
modify eavesdropped data that is transmitted via an NFC connection. One use case is, that 
an attacker simply disrupts the communication between devices by corrupting the data 
sent by other devices. This can be achieved by using eavesdropping during the communi-
cation and sending valid frequencies of data spectrum within a correct time period in 
communication. Correct time is calculated from the NFC communication modulation 
scheme. This attack simply does not allow the user to achieve correct communication re-
sults between devices [6]. NFC devices can detect the data corruption attacks by checking 
the RF field and the power of the transmitted RF waves. Power needed to create data cor-
ruption in NFC communication is much greater than the power used to normally com-
municate with NFC devices. Therefore all these attacks should be discoverable [6]. 
Data Modification 
A Data Modification attack is similar to a Data Corruption attack, but with the difference, 
that attacker-sent manipulated data is valid in NFC communication. Implementation-
ability of the attack highly depends on the applied strength of signal amplitude modula-
tion, as decoding of the signal differs for 100% and 10% modulation. When the communi-
cation is using 100% modulation, the decoder checks both half bits of RF signal on or RF 
signal off. To inject some valid data into the NFC communication, the attacker must fill 
the pause in the modulation with carrier frequency and generate a pause of RF signal, what 
is then received by correct party of the NFC communication. This means that the attacker 
must send RF signal in a so perfectly overlaps with the original RF signal, making the 
original signal a zero signal in receiving decoder, which is almost impossible to accom-
plish. 
  
In modified Miller encoding, in case of subsequent bits, the attacker can change the se-
cond bit to zero by modifying the pause that encodes the second bit. Doing that, the de-
coder would see no pause in the second bit and would decode it as zero, because the forgo 
bit was 1. Therefore, in 100% modulation, the attacker can only change bit value from 1 to 
0, in case bit is preceded by a bit of value 1, but never vice versa [6]. Using 10% modula-
tion, the decoder is measuring signal levels of 82% modulation and 100% modulation, 
compares them, and if they respond to the correct range, the signal gets decoded. An at-
tacker could try to increase the 82% signal to make it match the 100% signal, making it 
appear as full signal and making the actual full signal appear as 82% signal [29]. Doing 
that, the decoder would decode false bits into correct ones and correct bits into false ones. 
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Whether the attack is feasible, mostly depends on the input range of the receiver. It is like-
ly that the higher signal levels would exceed the input range of the receivers’ decoder, but 
the threat cannot be ruled out completely. We can say, that a data insertion attack is not 
achievable for 100% Miller encoding, but is possible for 10% Manchester encoding [6]. 
 
Possible solutions to avoid data modification attacks are: 
a) 106 KBaud transfer rates - By using only 106k Baud transfer rates, the attackers 
can not achieve data insertion attacks. However using this transfer rate makes the 
communication most vulnerable to eavesdropping described in section 2.2. 
b) Check RF field - Continuous check by sending the device to detect interference in 
RF field and stopping the data transaction when this kind of interference happens. 
c) Secure channel - Create an encrypted channel between two devices. Further de-
scribed in section 2.3 
Data Insertion 
Attacker inserts additional messages into NFC communication. This sort of attack can 
only happen, when the device answer takes a very long time. This means the attacker must 
send the data before the sending device sends it (replies to request) [29]. This attack is 
successful only if the attacker sends the whole data before the replying device starts to 
answer. When the two data streams are trying to transmit at the same time, then data colli-
sion happens and data gets corrupted [6]. 
 
There are multiple solutions to avoid this kind of attacks: 
a) No delay - Making the device communication without delays, so the answering de-
vice answers immediately, not giving the attacker enough time to interfere. (At-
tacker can not be faster than the correct device, they can be both the same speed, 
but sending the same data at once from two different sources results in data colli-
sion). 
b) Channel listening - Constantly listening to the communication channel so the de-
vices can detect a 3rd party trying to interfere communication. 
c) Secure channel – Create an encrypted channel between two devices. Further de-
scribed in section 2.3. 
Man-In-The-Middle 
A typical man-in-the-middle attack is when two parties want to talk to each other and are 
tricked into a three party communication by an attacker. For example: Device A wants to 
communicate with Device B, but at the start of the communication, Device C as an attack-
er tricks both devices into communication with Device C instead of each other. Device A 
and Device B are convinced that they are communicating with each other - shown in Fig-
ure 3.  
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This attack can happen regardless of a secure channel, as the secure channel endpoint is 
switched by Device C and Device A and B must have sufficient security knowledge to 
eliminate Device C as a valid endpoint for Device A or B. A Classical man-in-the-middle 
attack starts with key authentication, where Device A and Device B want to establish a 
secret key to set up a mutual secure channel. Device C creates secure channels with both 
Device A and Device B and the communication between Devices A and B seem complete-
ly normal to them.  
 
How does the man-in-the-middle attack behave in case of NFC communication? Assum-
ing Device A is in active- and device B in passive mode then the situation is as follows. 
Device A has generated an RF field to communicate with Device B. If Device C is close 
enough, it can read the data sent by Device A. Device C disrupts the transmission between 
A and B, so B does not receive the data. This can be achieved by Device C, but it is also 
visible to Device A and if A detects the attack it can stop the key agreement protocol 
communication. But to further analyze the man-in-the-middle attack we must assume that 
Device A does not detect the disturbance in the key exchange protocol. When Device C 
has successfully blocked A and B communication and received communication request by 
A, Device C must generate RF field to communicate with device B, meaning two RF 
fields must be active at the same time. It is impossible to align the two RF fields, making it 
impossible for Device B to understand the data sent by Device C. Because of this and the 
fact that Device A can easily detect the changes in the RF field it is evident that the man-
in-the-middle attack is practically impossible for NFC communication.  
 
The only other possible solution for the NFC man-in-the-middle attack is if Device A and 
Device B both use active modes. Then again assuming that Device A does not detect dis-
turbance in the RF field the attack is possible. This is due to the Active-Active communi-
cation. When Device A has sent data to Device B (Intercepted by Device C), device A 
turns off its RF field. Now Device C turn on RF field and send data to Device B. Now the 
problem here is, that Device A is also listening and expecting an answer from Device B. 
Instead of a response from Device B, it will receive an answer from Device C and can yet 
again detect the problem and stop the communication. Only possible man-in-the-middle 
attack in this case is switching the communication endpoint for Device A from Device B 
to Device C, and Device C must know what kind of answers Device A is waiting for. 
Therefore it can be said, that man in the middle attack is practically infeasible for NFC 
communication [6] and it does not need additional solutions to counter fight it. It is rec-
ommended, however, to use Active-Passive communication modes for high security risk 
NFC communication. In which case the active party should detect all abnormalities in the 
NFC field. 
 
Figure 3. Man-in-the-middle communication directions. 
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2.3 NFC Secure Channel Connection 
Having a secure channel between two NFC endpoints is clearly the best solution to avoid 
any kind of attack, as NFC has proven to be resistant to man-in-the-middle attack (de-
scribed is section 2.2). Therefore we can assume that it is secure to establish a secure 
channel connection between two NFC devices. In our case, it is a connection between an 
active NFC mobile device and a passive NFC smartcard. To achieve that, it is possible to 
use either Asymmetric cryptography or Symmetric cryptography. 
Public-Key Based Cryptography 
Public key based cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, is a cryptograph-
ic algorithm that uses two separate keys for each communication participant. Each partici-
pant has a set of private and public keys, that are mathematically linked. Public key is used 
for encrypting the plaintext into cipher text and for verifying the digital signature. Private 
key on the other hand is used to decrypt cipher text and to create digital signatures. It is 
called asymmetric, due to the use of two keys performing opposite functions. The security 
lies within the private key of the key pair. Public-Key cryptography relies wholly on the 
fact that it is computationally infeasible for a correctly generated private key to be de-
duced from its public key pair [8]. Therefore, the public key can be securely published to 
other parties without compromising the security of the protocol. Some public key algo-
rithms provide key distribution and secrecy, others provide digital signatures and some 
provide both. Therefore, a suitable public key cryptosystem must be chosen to handle key 
exchange and establish a secure channel. A standard RSA or Elliptic curve based cryptog-
raphy is suited for this kind of problems.   
 
Rivest Shamir Adelman (RSA) [26] is one of the oldest public key cryptography algo-
rithms and also the most used one at the moment. The RSA cryptosystem is based on the 
high computation cost of factoring, which means that having sufficient computational re-
sources and time, an adversary cannot obtain the private key from the key set via factor-
ing. Factoring is not the only method to break RSA, but at the moment no other method 
has proven successful either [10]. The RSA public and private key are generated based on 
the algorithm [25]: 
 
a) Select two random prime numbers a, b, always in a way that the bit length of a is 
approximately the same as of b 
b) Compute n = a * b 
c) Compute fi(n) = (a-1)*(b-1) 
d) Select a random integer e so that e < fi(n) and gdc(e, fi(n)) = 1, after that compute 
integer d, with e*d =1 mod fi(n) 
e) (n, e) is public key and d is private key 
To encrypt data m with public key then result s = hash(m)d(mod n) and to verify the result 
then hash h = se (mod n) 
 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is described with an equation [27]  
y2 = x3 + ab + b, where 4a3 + 27b2 != 0 
ECC public and private key are generated based on the following algorithm [10]:  
 
a) Find elliptic curve E(K), where K is finite field such as Fp or F2”, and find point Q 
on E(K). n is the order of Q  
b) Select pseudo random number x in a way that 1 <= x <= (n - 1) 
c) Compute point P = xQ 
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d) ECC key pair is (P, x) where P is public key and x is private key 
ECC uses smaller keys than RSA encryption algorithm [10], which is vital in the proposed 
NFC solution, as Java Card memory sizes needed to store keys and certificates are 
minimal. In terms of key generation ECC outperforms RSA at all key lengths with 
massive differences, as RSA 1024 key length key pair generation takes 0.16 seconds, but 
ECC manages to generate responding key with 0.08 seconds. In terms of signature 
generation, RSA outperforms ECC with the 0.01 seconds and 0.15 seconds respectively. 
In terms of signature verification, RSA also outperforms of ECC, with the difference of 
0.01 seconds and 0.23 seconds respectively. 
Public-Key-Cryptography Practical Considerations 
Forward Public Key Encryption (FPKE), is an encryption that makes sure, that communi-
cation is kept secret during transmission, as all data moving along the communication 
channel is encrypted. It assumes that both receiver and sender are in possession of their 
own private key and other parties’ public key. In order to send a message from one party 
to another using FPKE, the sender uses the receiver's public key as an encryption key and 
encrypts the contents of the message to be transmitted. After encryption, the message is 
sent to receiver. The receiver uses uses their own private key to decrypt the message con-
tents. Using the receiver's public key to encrypt the data is also useful for preserving the 
confidentiality of the message, as only receiver with the appropriate private key can de-
crypt the message. Therefore once the sender has encrypted the message with receiver's 
public key, it is impossible for the sender to decrypt it. Although, FPKE do not protect 
against the non-repudiation problem, as the message could be sent by anyone who has 
access to receiver's public key. Therefore, the author argues, that FPKE alone is not secure 
enough for proposed NFC security solution and there is a need to further analyze possible 
usages of Public Key Encryption solutions. 
 
Inverse Public Key Encryption (IPKE), also known as digital signature, is based on the 
sender encrypting the message with his private key and adding the result to the message as 
signature. The receiver receives the message along with the digital signature of the mes-
sage, and then uses the sender’s public key to verify the message signature, making sure 
that the sender is correct. IPKE is the complete opposite of the FPKE, as it ensures the 
non-repudiation of the message, but it does not secure the message itself. Therefore the 
author claims that IPKE is also unusable in proposed security solution, as it does not pro-
tect against eavesdropping. 
 
Enveloped Public Key Encryption (EPKE) is applying public-key cryptography and both 
ensuring that the transaction communication is handled confidentially, and that the con-
tents are protected against modifications and non-repudiation. This method is mainly used 
in open network environments similar to the environment in the proposed solution. EPKE 
makes use of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). EPKE 
consist of both Forward Public Key Encryption and Inverse Public Key Encryption, creat-
ing the foundation of Enveloped Public Key Encryption. In order for the EPKE to work, 
the following is required: 
 
a) Each communication party has their own unique set of public and private keys. 
b) Every participant's private and public key set must be mathematically related, as 
party’s private key must be able to decrypt data encrypted by the party's public key 
and party’s public key must be able to verify data signed with the party’s private 
key. 
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c) The private key is kept private and only the owner of the private key knows it, 
whereas the public key is published to other communication parties. 
d) Communication parties must be aware of the public keys used by other trusted par-
ties, making sure the communication is only allowed between trusted participants. 
 
In order to send the message using EPKE, the message must be encrypted by the sender's 
private key and the result must be added to the message, ensuring non-repudiation of the 
message. Then the sender encrypts the message together with a digital signature using the 
receiver's public key. Now the message is in a so called digital envelope and is sent to the 
receiver. After receiving, the receiver decrypts the message using its private key, revealing 
the message and the digital signature of this message. Now the receiver uses the sender’s 
public key to verify that the message is received from the correct sender, and validating 
that the message is in fact correct. The author claims that EPKE is the most suitable form 
of Public Key encryption to be used within the proposed solution, as it is secure from 
eavesdropping and enables to verify the sender of messages. 
 
The proposed solution uses Java Cards to handle one part of the communication protocol. 
This means the computational powers of these cards are limited, but due to the 
computationally complex nature of the RSA encryption algorithm, the time used to 
encrypt/decrypt amounts of data can increase vastly depending on the amount of data 
decrypted/encrypted. To overcome the issue of handling bigger amounts of data, the 
author suggests to use data hashing prior to the private key encryption, reducing the 
amount of data encrypted to fixed amount based on the hashing algorithm. Using SHA1 
hashing algorithm the large amounts of data can be reduced to 160 bits of data that need to 
be encrypted. Both sender and receiver must be aware of the signature hashing and signing 
functionality, otherwise the digital signature comparisons will not match. The only 
downfall of using this sort of hashing prior to encryption is that smaller than 160 bit data 
gets hashed to 160 bit data, making the amount of data encrypted bigger that it originally 
was. Table 3 shows the difference between SHA1 hashing and RSA encryption signing in 
one second. There is a difference of over 100 times between SHA1 hashing and RSA 
encryption, as shown in Table 3. Further analysis is described in Appendix 2. 
The author’s proposed Public Key cryptography secure channel solution proposes the use 
of EPKE together with session handling and symmetric cryptography. As the sender and 
receiver have knowledge of each others public keys, they can obtain the knowledge during 
communication establishment or have it predefined for them. When communication is 
started, the initiator verifies the receiver by requesting a public key. On receiving 
receiver's public key, the sender generates a session key and encrypts it using the 
receiver's public key. The receiver then receives the session key by decrypting the 
message with its private key. Now sender and receiver have a shared temporary session 
Table 3.  SHA1 and RSA encryption benchmarking. 
Block size SHA1 RSA 
512 bit 5807998.5 hash / s 7334.6 sign / s 
1024 bit 416352.3 hash / s 2099.3 sign / s 
2048 bit 57689.7 hash / s 397.3 sign / s 
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key they can use to encrypt the messages. By encrypting the messages with shared 
knowledge, the sender only needs to encrypt the message, without even digitally signing 
the message, as the temporary shared session key assures the communication is coming 
from the correct sender. This also allows the receiver and sender to use symmetric 
encryption which is faster than asymmetric encryption. This proposed solution is the same, 
as web TLS protocol is handling the key verification, secret sharing and channel creation. 
Symmetric Cryptography With Shared Secret 
Symmetric cryptography is a single key cryptography, where the same key is used to en-
crypt and decrypt message data. This cryptography is mainly used to encrypt data with 
shared knowledge, so that whoever needs to use the encrypted data, they need the same 
encryption secret to decrypt it. Symmetric cryptography can be used for the proposed se-
curity solution, by simply sharing the secret between NFC mobile devices and NFC smart-
cards. In this case the sender encrypts the message with the shared key and a suitable algo-
rithm before sending the encrypted message to the receiver. Receiver decrypts the message 
with the same key obtained during initialization. As per Java Card 3.0.4 API documenta-
tion, the same Java Card version the Estonian ID card is based on, Java Card supports 
multiple different symmetric cryptography algorithms that can be used for this sort of 
shared secret security channel. Supported symmetric cryptography algorithms are AES, 
DES, 3DES and SEED [11].  
 
Author rules out SEED algorithm, as it is mainly used in South Korea and not many solu-
tions support it. Java Card does support it, but it works with a 64-bit key, which is too 
weak for our liking [12]. The author also rules out DES algorithm, as it is an older, less 
secure version of DDES algorithm, using a single 64-bit block cipher under a 56-bit key 
[13]. That leaves us with 3DES and AES algorithms. In the following section, the author 
analyses 3DES and AES symmetric encryption algorithms and tries to find the best suita-
ble algorithm for the proposed NFC security solution.  
 
Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) was developed on top of DES, correcting the 
flaws in the single DES encryption algorithm. DES key is 56-bit and 16 cycle Feistel sys-
tem is used with 16 48-bit sub keys permuted from the one 56-bit key - One key for each 
Feistel cycle [1]. Algorithm basic for 3DES are the same, as they are in DES encryption, 
but the key size is triple the size of the key in DES algorithm. This is simply handled by 
doing 3 different encryptions with 3 given keys on the same block of data, therefore all 
operations of DES encryption must be done three times, each time using different part of 
the given 168-bit key. 3DES data encryption throughput is slightly smaller than DES 
throughput, coming from 3 times the encryption done with the message blocks, but it is 
not 3 times smaller as we would to assume [4]. 
 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was developed to replace DES encryption algo-
rithm, and is based on substitution and permutation. AES uses Rijndael algorithm, which 
has a fixed block size of 128-bit and key size of 128, 192 or 256 bit. Key size determines 
the number of repetitions of transformation rounds done to get the cipher text output.  
 
a) For 128-bit key, 10 repetition cycles are made 
b) For 192-bit key, 12 repetition cycles are made 
c) For 256-bit key, 14 repetition cycles are made 
 
Each repetition consists of 4 processing rounds: 
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a) SubBytes - Each byte in a state matrix is replaced with a sub byte, using an 8-bit 
substitution box, also known as Rijndael S-box 
b) ShiftRows - Shifts bytes in matrix rows by a certain offset 
c) MixColumns - Takes four bytes from column and outputs four bytes, where input 
bytes affect all four output bytes via linear transformation 
d) AddRoundKey - Adds derived sub key to round 
 
Based on the research of [4], we can also assume that AES encryption is slightly better at 
encrypting and decrypting plain text, hex or byte data and that the AES key size affects the 
cipher text computation time very little.  
 
There is no vital difference between AES and 3DES encryption when dealing with small 
amounts of data, as encryption time only becomes evident when encrypting or decrypting 
data bigger than 5 megabytes [4]. As the author’s proposed system uses Java Cards to 
handle data encryption and decryption, the data sent between the Java Card and mobile 
device never exceeds 5 megabytes, as the maximum single message size is 32 kilobytes 
[11]. It would take 5 x 1021 years to break AES 128-bit encryption [1], but it only takes 
800 Days to crack 3DES 112 bit key. Based on these findings, we can be certain, that AES 
encryption algorithm is secure and fast enough to use in the proposed NFC security solu-
tion. Based on these results, it is safe to claim, that the AES encryption would be the best 
choice for the proposed NFC security solution. 
2.4 Web Application Security 
Security is constantly the main concern when building a new web application from the 
ground up. There are multiple security solutions out there that have single-factor authenti-
cation and multiple-factor authentication schemes. Picking the correct security solution for 
your application depends largely on the security level needed for the application and how 
paranoid your system must be. The top four security breaches for web applications are to 
do with cross-site scripting, information leakage and broken access controls [16].  
 
a) Cross-site scripting is an attack where the attacker exploits the user logged in func-
tionality and accesses other user data by brute-forcing himself/herself as another 
user, having the knowledge of how the site is scripted for every user. 
b) Information leakage is an attack, where the application handles errors badly, and 
leaking information through thrown errors. 
c) Broken access control is an attack that enables attacker to access someone else's 
data with their own account. 
d) Broken authentication is an attack where the attacker can authenticate him-
self/herself as someone else and use the system with someone else’s account. 
 
Broken authentication attacks are the main attack type the author’s proposed solution is 
trying to fix. This is the only thing that can be generalized throughout every web applica-
tion. Fixes for cross-site scripting, information leakage and broken access controls depend 
heavily on the web application they are used in and need to be prevented during the devel-
opment of the web application. Therefore we are looking into different ways of web appli-
cation authentication compared to the author’s proposed one.  
 
Single factor authentication uses only one type of authorization and is open to multiple 
different attacks - eavesdropping, dictionary attacks replay attacks etc. [7] Therefore, the 
single factor authentication can be completely ruled out when building a web application 
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with high security needs. After ruling out single-factor authentication, secure web applica-
tion development is left with multiple factor authentications to pick the correct one for the 
respective solution. 
Two-Factor Authentication 
Most commonly used authentication form is the two-factor authentication (TFA) where 
the authentication passes two different devices or tokens, both in the possession of the 
same user, making it twice as secure, as single-factor authentication. Two-factor authenti-
cation can give us three guarantees [3], as we can ask for three types of evidence for iden-
tity: 
 
a) Something material the user has (Smartcard, mobile device etc.) 
b) Something the user has remembered (Password, picture etc.) 
c) Something the user is (Biometrical - fingerprint, picture etc.) 
 
In order to achieve TFA we need to choose two types of proof from the given list. Usually 
a user-remembered password phrase and user material object is used, as according to [3] 
biometrical authentication is the weaker form of security authentication. Biometrical 
factors can be easily copied - fingerprints can be retrieved from any surface you touch 
without gloves or protective gear. Even the mobile phone can be used to copy your 
biometrics - therefore biometrics is yet to be advanced to use it successfully in secure 
solutions. When creating an authentication scheme, where two device are in the loop of 
authentication, it is crucial to make sure that both of these devices are in control of the 
same user [7]. Therefore the registration phase of the devices must be secure and handled 
only once, at signup or device switching. if the device registration phase is handled 
correctly, and authentication is done using two different endpoints, the system can be more 
sure that the user authenticating himself/herself is actually the user he/she claims to be. 
The device used for two-factor authentication can differ according to the selected 
authentication solution - mobile device, smart card, token generator, service, computer etc. 
 
Most similar to the author’s proposed NFC smartcard authentication from two-factor 
authentication, is the web application smart card authentication. A solution, where a 
smartcard is used together with a smartcard reader to authenticate a user to the system. 
The Estonian ID card solution can be taken as a perfect example - it allows users to log 
into different web applications by simply authenticating himself/herself via an Estonian 
government-issued smart card. Regular EstEID solutions work by simply asking the user 
for username and then prompting the user directly to the smart card authentication. This 
solution that can not be considered 100% regular TFA, as it requests the user to input 
his/hers remembered password on the smart card instead of the web application, but it still 
ticks all the needed boxes for two factor authentication [2].  
 
The Estonian ID card solution can be altered to work similarly to a regular TFA, 
prompting the user for a password together with a username, and requesting the user to 
input password for the smart card also, but this kind of a solution is working against user 
experience and common practices of TFA. The author’s proposed NFC solution smart card 
works similar to the regular EstEID smartcard, providing all the same functionality via 
NFC as the Estonian ID card provides via smart card reader, but it can’t be considered as a 
rival solution for EstEID, as NFC security solution can act as an extra feature of EstEID 
solution. 
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Three-Factor Authentication 
Similar to the two-factor authentication, three-factor authentication uses the same three 
evidence of identity, but it is using biometrics in addition to the user-remembered 
passphrase and the physical device.  Biometric authentication is an identification of user 
via human characteristics - fingerprint, voiceprint and iris scan [9]. These characteristics 
are believed to be reliable, as they hold vast amount of high-entropy information that can 
not be lost or forgotten. A third biometric authentication factor can be added to the simple 
two-factor smart card authentication by just adding another step to pass in biometric data 
to authentication flow. Together with adding biometric data to the authentication flaw 
comes the responsibility to handle biometric data by allowing user to change it similar to a 
password change [9]. But having three-factor authentication, computational costs are 
multiplied, as biometric validation requires high computational power and the additional 
security received from it, is not that secure, as biometrics can be easily replicated. In 
conclusion, adding a third factor to TFA is costly and not very beneficial, as it does not 
eliminate any extra attack types that the two-factor authentication does not already 
address. 
Proposed NFC Solution Web Application Security 
The author’s proposed NFC web application security solution can be qualified as an ad-
vancement of the two-factor authentication and we can go to the extent of calling it 2.5-
factor authentication. The proposed solution uses two user-remembered passphrases: 
a) Web application passphrase 
b) Smart card passphrase 
 In addition to that, it uses two user verified devices: 
a) NFC mobile device 
b) NFC smart card 
The main authentication functionality is based on the regular smart card two-factor au-
thentication. Similar to [14], this solution contains 4 + 1 different authentication phases: 
 
A. Registration phase 
a. System distributes customer NFC smart cards with PIN envelopes to users. 
b. User authenticates mobile device by entering their username and password 
within NFC mobile application. 
B. Login phase 
a. User tries to login into web application. Web application prompts the user 
to select login device view 
C. Authentication phase 
a. User receives verification request to selected mobile device. User authoriz-
es himself/herself with the given NFC card or Estonian ID card by entering 
PIN into mobile device connected with appropriate NFC card 
D. Password change phase  
a. User opens mobile application and wishes to change NFC card PIN. User 
verifies himself/herself with PIN2 and is able to enter new PIN1. This is 
completely offline phase and everything is handled by mobile device and 
NFC card 
b. User requests to change web application passphrase, authentication is car-
ried out similar to the Authentication phase and user gets to change the 
passphrase 
E. Device change phase (Additional phase) 
 
 
20 
a. User can add, remove or switch accounts related to mobile device by being 
in possession of the username, NFC card and password. 
 
What makes the author’s proposed solution unique is the fact that it can verify two differ-
ent customer devices, allowing the user be in possession of two authorized devices (Both 
smart card and mobile device). By doing that the solution adds an additional security layer 
on top of the regular smartcard authentication solution, allowing the user to use their mo-
bile phone as smart card reader, verifying the user mobile device at the same time. This 
functionality is missing, when using regular smart card readers. Similarly to the Estonian 
ID card, the user NFC smart cards hold 3 different user PIN numbers, making it possible 
to request different level of authorization when performing different tasks. PIN numbers 
unlock the access to user certificates held on the NFC smart card. With these certificates, 
user can either authorize or sign requests. 
Comparison 
In order to prove the legitimacy of the author’s proposed solution, a comparison of differ-
ent web application authentications against the author’s proposed one is needed. To give a 
better comparison we take into account different web application authentication possibili-
ties. Therefore we compare Single-Factor, Two-Factor, Three-Factor and the author’s pro-
posed authentications. Based on Table 4 we can completely rule out Single-Factor Authen-
tication and Three-Factor Authentication as competitive solutions for author proposed 
NFC security authentication solution. Two-Factor authentication can be considered as a 
main competitive solution for the NFC security authentication solution, but they cannot be 
compared as equal, as the NFC security solution is an improvement of Two-Factor Au-
thentication. Both solutions offer better security with multiple security layers at the cost of 
user experience. Both require an extra step from the user and take a bit longer to success-
fully authenticate the user than the Single-Factor Authentication does. Based on this, it is 
safe to say, that the author’s proposed NFC security solution is a valid Two-Factor Au-
thentication improvement and can be taken as a competitive authentication solution for 
other Two-Factor Authentication solutions. 
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2.5 Existing Authentication Solutions 
In order to give a better estimate of the proposed solution’s efficiency and profitability, 
there is a need for competition research. As this solution is one of a kind and has no direct 
competition solution wise, general estimation of authentication solutions must be provided 
and comparison between different existing authentication and signing solutions has to be 
made. After examining different solutions, a decision was made, if the proposed solution 
brings a better authentication solution to the table, or is it just another authentication solu-
tion similar to the variety of different solutions out there. In order to analyze the different 
authentication and signing solutions, a solution with different purpose and architecture 
was selected, focusing the selection on Two-Factor authentication, mobile devices and 
NFC.    
Image-Based Authentication 
Image-based authentication relies on the preliminary authentication of the user, during 
which the user selects multiple different images from an image grid as a passphrase (user 
needs to remember all of the images without correct order). During the authentication re-
quest, the user is given a 3x3 or a 4x4 picture matrix [40] with some of the user authenti-
cated pictures and along with random pictures. Within this picture matrix, user must select 
the correct (previously selected) images. The given solution is supported by Confident 
Technologies1 and is relying on the fact that person's memory is better at remembering 
pictures, than random passwords and this solution can not be attacked with a key-logger, 
as the pictures occur in a random order and in random places. This also provides the secu-
rity of detecting device authorization pattern using fingerprints left on the mobile device 
                                                
1 http://confidenttechnologies.com/ 
2 http://www.google.com/about/company/ 
3 http://openid.net/ 
Table 4.  Single-Factor, Two-Factor, Three-Factor and Author Proposed authentication 
solution comparison. 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Single-Factor Authentication + Simple 
+ Fast 
+ User friendly 
+ Single point of failure 
+ No service integrations 
- Only one protecting pass-
phrase 
- No security endpoint 
- Unsecure 
- Easy to bypass 
Two-Factor Authentication + User friendly 
+ Fast 
+ Reliable 
- One security endpoint 
- Complex user experience 
Three-Factor Authentication + Multiple layered security 
+ Third biometrical factor 
+ Big future opportunities 
- Slow 
- High computing require-
ments 
- Easy to bypass 
- Hard to develop 
- One security endpoint 
Author NFC Authentication + 2 security passphrases 
+ 2 separate security endpoints 
+ User friendly 
+ Secure 
+ Reliable 
- Complex user experience 
- Multiple service integrations 
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screen [33]. To make remembering the pictures easier for the user during security solution 
initialization, the user can only select certain categories instead of exact pictures and later 
will need to identify correct category pictures during authentication, making it possible to 
add large selection of images to each category.  
SMS One-Time Password 
SMS One-Time Password (OTP) authentication scheme uses SMS service to send a one-
time password to authorize the user. This scheme uses known user devices to provide a 
second level of authentication to the user. In order to access the application, the user must 
have the passphrase and his/her mobile device. After entering the passphrase, the applica-
tion send an SMS including OTP for single-usage login, and user must enter the received 
password into the application. This is the example usage of TFA described in section 2.4 
in this thesis. The most widely known SMS one-time password solution is Google’s2 two-
factor authentication solution. Another way to use the SMS OTP, is to use it directly from 
the mobile device, as the mobile application receives SMS from the server containing the 
password and uses this password directly with no user actions needed. This password is 
only valid for one single login session and is terminated after user logs out of the applica-
tion or it expires due to user inactivity. 
Device Generated One Time Password 
Similar to the SMS one-time password solution (described in section 2.5.2), the device 
generated OTP solution uses a generated limited time single-login password for authenti-
cation, with the difference, that the OTP is generated within the user device. OTP genera-
tion is in this case software based and usually requires the device time to be synchronized 
with server’s time [32]. The best example is yet again from Google called Google Authen-
ticator - a mobile application generating 6 figure OTP codes to be used as second authenti-
cation factor for users. This is relying on the solution, that user first authenticates him-
self/herself with registration passphrase and after the password authentication has been 
successful, a second level of authentication is requested with the user’s device and Google 
Authenticator mobile application. Device generated OTP is better than SMS OTP, as the 
                                                
2 http://www.google.com/about/company/ 
Table 5.  Image based authentication pros and cons. 
Pros Cons 
- User do not have to remember passphrases  
- Not distinguishable fingerprints left on the 
screen 
 
- 3x3 picture matrix with selected 3 catego-
ries only gives 84 possible passwords 
- Vulnerable for brute force attacks 
- Pictures must be unambiguous to every-
one 
 
Table 6. SMS OTP pros and cons. 
Pros Cons 
- Second factor based on “Something you 
have” token 
- SMS delivery time may vary 
- Cloned devices receive the same SMS 
- Usability 
rP 
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generated one time password will never travel over network between device and server. 
OTP is generated in the mobile application and user enters the generated code directly to 
the requesting application. 
Out-of-Band Authentication 
Out-of-Band authentication is based on an automated phone call from the server to the 
user device in order to authenticate the user. This solution is using completely different 
channel (from the channel the authentication request has been started) to communicate 
with user and by doing that, eliminating the security issue of using the same channel for all 
authentication activity. The authentication flow is simple, as when user tries to login to 
application, the server automatically calls the user mobile device and dictates a pass 
phrase or code for the user to enter into the application in order to authenticate 
himself/herself [39]. This solutions security level is similar to the SMS OTP solution 
(described in section 2.5.2), as it uses different channel and OTP to authenticate the user. 
Biometrics 
Biometric authentication is using user’s unique biometrical fingerprint for authentication. 
The characteristics used are usually based on the user’s physiological appearance and not 
based on the behavior of the user. [33] The most common characteristic is fingerprint, but 
person has multiple different unique physiological characteristics that can be used for au-
thentication. For example the user’s tone of voice, eye iris, face metrics etc. the main prob-
lem for using biometrics as a main authentication endpoint is the fact that not many devic-
es provide biometric identification for their user, biometric authentication devices are ex-
pensive and the solutions are also expensive to develop and integrate. Biometric authenti-
cation provides third level to authentication patterns enabling Three-Factor Authentication 
[38] described in section 2.4 user’s biometric fingerprint can not be changed during theft 
either and therefore it is not suited to be the single point of user authentication. 
Table 7. Device Generated OTP pros and cons. 
Pros Cons 
- Second factor based on “Something you 
have” token 
- Cloned devices can generate the same 
OTP 
- Usability 
- Internally attackable 
Table 8. Out-of-Band authentication pros and cons. 
Pros Cons 
- Server can verify mobile device together 
with user authentication 
- Voice channel is insecure 
- Cloned device can receive the call 
- Not suitable for high risk solutions 
- Hard to implement on server side 
- Expensive 
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Another Application for Authentication 
Similar to OpenID3 solutions, another application provides user authentication for the 
required authentication. This solution can be used if the company’s do not want to create 
their own authentication solution and are trusting another vendors to provide a secure and 
reliable authentication solution. This solution provides application full authentication flow 
without having to implement it themselves. Excellent examples of complete such solutions 
are Google OAuth4 and Estonian ID card, where full authentication is handled by the 
vendors and either successful authentication or the unsuccessful authentication response is 
returned to the application. Google OAuth relies on generated tokens and returns a user 
session token to application that requested the authentication [34]. The Estonian ID card 
solution provides a unique user certification-based solution, where the user can login using 
their ID card solution [35]. 
Authentication+Using+Mobile+Device+NFC+Emulation+
This authentication solution is based on the capabilities of the mobile device emulating a 
NFC card. Usually the security is stored on the mobile SIM card and the mobile phone 
simply communicates with the SIM card to access the user’s private key in order to 
provide the needed cryptography and authenticate the user via mobile device, but there is 
also a possibility of adding an encrypted secure store within the mobile application to store 
the secrets and provide the needed cryptography. This solution works similar to the author 
proposed solution, but with the difference that the mobile device itself is the NFC card, 
providing card functionality to NFC readers that are communicating with application user 
is using within workstation [36]. The user must enter a PIN to authenticate himself within 
the mobile NFC security environment and after successful verification the device 
communicates with NFC reader to send authenticated user data over to the reader. This 
solution adds one extra layer to regular Two-Factor Authentication by requesting user PIN 
                                                
3 http://openid.net/ 
4 https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/OAuth2 
Table 9. Biometric authentication pros and cons. 
Pros Cons 
- Unique to every user 
- Linking account to physical person 
- Expensive 
- Irreplaceable 
- Very few devices support it 
P 
Table 10. Another application for authentication pros and cons. 
Pros Cons 
- Single authentication endpoint 
- User must remember only one solution 
passphrase 
- Convenient for user 
- Authentication control lost to vendors 
- No certainty, if solution is hacked 
- No information regarding the actual au-
thentication flow 
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within the mobile device, allowing this solution to have 2 passcodes, similar to author 
proposed solution. The only downside of this solution is, that the user does not have 
another extra security NFC card to separate it from the mobile device he/she is using. This 
solution also requires an additional NFC reader – a problem the author is trying to resolve, 
as users usually do not have NFC readers and they are reluctant to buy additional 
hardware.  
RFID+Rag+As+Additional+Security+Token+
This security solution is based on the NFC reader mobile phones being able to read RFID 
(Radio Frequency Identification) tags drom NFC cards and transmitting them to the server. 
This means each user must have their own NFC card with unique RFID. During 
authentication, the user receives a request to their mobile phone to read the RFID tag and 
authenticate himself/herselt into the application [37]. This solution is again similar to the 
author proposed one, but it only read RFID from the NFC card and does not utilize all the 
possibilities an NFC card can provide. As anyone can read the RFID from this card, it 
means this card is not protected and if an attacker gets access to the card and the device, 
then after knowing the passcode, nothing is topping the attacker from accessing the 
account. Therefore this RFID only provides one physical token that needs to be kept 
separate from the authentication device. 
Password+Authentication+Solution+
Password authentication solution is the most commonly used means of authentication out 
there. This is based on a single passphrase and a username a user must remember in order 
to authenticate himself/herself within a given application.  
Table 11. NFC card emulation authentication. 
Pros Cons 
- Easy to use 
- One device for authentication 
- Multiple solutions can use the same im-
plementation and device application 
- Personalizing each user device is hard and 
time consuming 
- Additional reader required 
- No separation between user device and 
security holder 
- No secure placement of keys, if SIM is not 
used 
- Requires special SIM from operators 
Table 12. RFID as security token. 
Pros Cons 
- Easy to use 
- Additional “something you have” token 
- Simple to distribute between users 
- Cheap to implement 
- Multiple usages to the same RFID card 
- No security within the RFID card 
- Easy to replicate  
- No certainty, if solution is hacked 
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Comparison+
In order to compare these different solutions and to prove the validity of the author’s 
proposed solution, there is a need to compare the security and usability of different 
solutios compared to the one the author is proposing. In order to do that, security and 
usability comparison tables are presented. In order to compare the different security 
solutions security, author examines the resistance of the solution to the following attacks: 
[36] 
a) Physical observation 
b) Targeted impersonation - Attacker tries to impersonate a user after observing the 
user’s authentication procedure.  
c) Guessing attack - Attacker tries to guess the passphrases. 
d) Internal observation - Attacker can impersonate a user by intercepting the user’s 
input from inside the user’s device.  
e) Leaks from other verifiers  
f) Man-in-the-Middle attack 
 
The security comparison of different existing authentication solutions is described in Table 
14. If column is marked with ‘O’ then the given solution is resistant to the given attack. If 
the column is marked with ‘X’, then the solution is vulnerable to these attacks. 
Table 14. Comparison of different solutions security. 
  
 Passw
ord authentication 
 Im
age based authentication 
 SM
S O
TP 
 D
evice generated O
TP 
 O
ut-of-B
and authentication 
 B
iom
etrics 
 A
nother application for authentication 
 N
FC
 em
ulation authentication 
 R
FID
 tag as authentication token 
 A
uthor proposed solution 
Physical observation X X O O O O X O O O 
Targeted impersonation X O O O O O X O O O 
Guessing attack X X O O O O O O O O 
Internal observation X X X X O X X O X O 
Leaks from other verifi-
ers X X X X X X X O O O 
Man-in-the-Middle X X O X X X X O O O 
 
Table 13. Password authentication. 
Pros Cons 
- Easy to use 
- Fast  
- Easy to recover 
- Easy to distribute 
- Insecure 
- Not scalable 
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In order to give an appropriate usability comparison of different usability criteria must be 
made. Usability cirterias used for comparison are [36] 
a) Memorywise effort – Measuring the amount of information the user has to 
remember 
b) Scalability place on users – The amount of information needed to remember each 
different solution using this sort of authentication 
c) Nothing to carry – The amount of extra devices/features needed from the user in 
order to authenticate himself/herself 
d) Physical effortless – How much physical effort the user must make within the 
authentication flow 
e) Efficiency – How long does the authentication process take 
f) Infrequent error – Reliability of the authentication solution 
g) Easy recovery from loss – Recoverability of the authentication solution, if a user 
forgets the required passphrases 
For the usability comparison, the password authentication solution is taken as reference 
point and if the performance/usability of the given scheme is better than with the password 
authentication, then it will be marked with ‘+’ sign. If the performance is the same as with 
the password solution, it is marked as ‘=’ and if the performace/usability is worse than 
with the password scheme, then it is marked with ‘-‘. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As it is visible from the usability comparison in Table 15, security always comes at a price 
for user experience and usability. The more difficult the authentication solution, the more 
it requires the user to make the physical effort and memorize different passphrases. The 
Table 15. Comparison of different solutions usability. 
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Scalability = = = = = + + + + + 
Nothing to carry = = - - - - - - - - 
Physical effort = = - - - - - - - - 
Efficiency = - - - - - - - - - 
Infrequent error = - - - - - - = = = 
Recoverability = - - - = - - - - + 
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author’s solution is better for recoverability, when the user has forgotten his/hers PIN1, 
then he/she can recover it using PIN2 and can even do it offline without any outside 
connection whatsoever. In the case that the user has lost his/hers NFC card, then the 
recoverability is inconveniet for the user, as he/she needs a new card. When it comes to 
security, the author’s proposed solution has similar security as the NFC emulated card 
does and is resistant to most attacks. Physical observation is not enough to bypass the 
security within author proposed security solution, as even if you have the passphrases user 
has, you need the user’s device and the user’s NFC card also. Impersonation is impossible, 
as private certificates are located on top of the NFC card and they are not extractable from 
it. Guessing attack is also impossible, as NFC PIN1 and PIN2 have only 3 tries before it 
locks the card. Internal observation would not be successful either, as it is impossible to 
observ NFC card internally. No other verifiers are user within the author’s proposed 
solution, eliminating all other verification-based security risks. The impossibility of Man-
In-The-Middle attack in the context of NFC was explained in section 2.2 of this thesis.  
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3 Proposed NFC Security Solution for Web Applications 
The author’s proposed NFC security authentication solution extends web application secu-
rity to a new level, enabling user verification via the NFC Java Card solution. Each user 
receives their own security card, issued by authorized issuing authorities like the Estonian 
government. Which the card enables the user to log into different web applications using 
their personal passcodes.   
3.1 Platform Selection 
Java Card platform was selected for the NFC smartcards, as it gives the possibility to add 
custom applications on top of smart cards, that can be accessed via contactless (NFC) or 
contacted reader interfaces. For the given prototype, a multi interface Java Card solution is 
selected, which means Java Card has both contactless and contact interface enabled at the 
same time, giving access to shared memory space on the card, using the same Java Card 
application. As NFC is an integrate part of the security solution, there is a need for an NFC 
compatible mobile device. Possible selections are Android OS (operating system), IOS or 
Windows OS based device. IOS devices do not have proper NFC support therefore we rule 
them out immediately. Selection between Windows and Android must be made. Based on 
Q4 2014 data, Android OS holds a market share of 76.6% compared to the 2.8% market 
share of Windows phone [19]. Due to the huge market gap, an Android OS based phone is 
selected. 
 
The web application platform can be selected based on the creators liking and the given 
backend solutions (server solution) can be implemented with all the best-known web ap-
plication solutions. The only requirement is, that the solution must be compatible with the 
Google Cloud Messaging service [18], used for Android communication. For the proto-
type, the author is using Java based web application platform called Grails5, an open 
source free to use framework for Java Virtual Machines. Allowing to build Java web solu-
tions using Groovy, Grails and Hibernate. Grails has the whole Java web service develop-
ment tools combined together with its integrated ORM6, domain specific Languages, me-
ta- and asynchronous programming [17]. Grails has multiple connection adapters for dif-
ferent databases, but for this solution, MySQL7 database engine is selected to work hand-
in-hand with the Java Hibernate8 database connector. One of the biggest benefits of the 
Grails web framework is its ability to create and distribute software plugins with ease, 
enabling the solution to be integrated into other web applications seamlessly. 
3.2 Architecture 
The proposed NFC security solutions architecture can be divided into 2 separate sections, 
separated by a secure web layer. One part of the solution is the user side (left hand side of 
the Figure 4), where the user has his/hers workstation, mobile phone and NFC security 
card. The other side of the solution (right hand side of the Figure 4.) is the web application 
server side that handles the data sent to the user and the access given to the user. Between 
those sides is the vast open web (Internet) with a secure channel connecting both sides of 
                                                
5 https://grails.org/ 
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Object-relational_mapping 
7 https://www.mysql.com/ 
8 http://hibernate.org/ 
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this solution and a Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) service to handle the NFC authentica-
tion start. 
 
User side consists of user mobile device (android device in the prototyping phase), com-
puter and NFC card. User operates on computer and is required for additional security 
authentication. User device receives a authentication required notification via GCM ser-
vice and user is prompted into authentication application, where user must connect NFC 
card with the device and enter a PIN for the NFC card. The server side consists of a serv-
er solution hosting the web application the user is using and managing security levels to-
gether with user NFC card certificates. Server side is connected to GCM service to send 
notifications to user devices, requiring authentication from user.  
Server 
Server architecture contains a local machine running Tomcat 8.0.15 web server and host-
ing a JVM website within this Tomcat web server. For the database, this solution is using 
MySQL database. Website is built on Grails Model View Controller (MVC) solution and 
is using hibernate and MySQL J connector [20] to connect with server MySQL database. 
The Web Server architecture is described in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 4. High-level solution architecture. 
 
Figure 5. Server architecture. 
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This application is also integrated with Google Cloud Messaging service (GCM) [18], that 
has the capability to deliver notifications to client phones, waking them up from sleep and 
saving the effort to keep customer phone constantly connected to the web server. The 
GCM connection is established via regular HTTP [21] calls.  
Smartphone Application 
The mobile application is based on Android mobile phones with NFC readers. This appli-
cation is built using Android Software Development Kit (SDK) [22]. The mobile NFC app 
uses the device embedded NFC reader to access Java Card information and functionality. 
App also has the capabilities to use Android-embedded Key Store to keep web application 
certificate for TLS 1.2 communication. Google cloud messaging service is using android 
notification service, sending notifications to NFC Android application and starting appli-
cation authentication flow. The Android application architecture is described in Figure 6. 
 
Android application uses Android SDK embedded IsoDep9 communication protocol to 
communicate with the Java Card application via the NFC reader. IsoDep protocol connects 
to Java Card and communicates via APDU (Application Protocol Data Unit) calls [11]. 
Possible APDU calls are described in Appendix 1.  
 
Java Card 
The smart card used in this solution is dual interface Infineon jTop Java Card v3.0 with 
shared memory. The dual interface allows users to use both contactless and contact smart 
card interface enabling the use of this card with both NFC and regular smartcard readers. 
This card has shared memory between two interfaces, giving access to the same Java Card 
applet via both interfaces. Inside this shared memory is the Java Card applet containing 
APDU processing solution. Smart card architecture is described in Figure 7. 
                                                
9 http://developer.android.com/reference/android/nfc/tech/IsoDep.html 
 
Figure 6. Smartphone application architecture. 
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The Java Card application is based on the Estonian ID card, using the same APDU’s as the 
Estonian ID card does [5]. This gives the ability to directly use Estonian NFC ID card for 
authentication, when it is enabled in the near future. Commands, enabled in the NFC ap-
plication and Java Card applet, are listed in Appendix 1. 
3.3 Data Model 
Application is using Read-, Write-, Update (RWU) database model, where new entries can 
only be added, read or updated,but not deleted. Database domain model is described in 
Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 7. Java Card architecture. 
Figure 8. Server application domain model 
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The data model described in Figure 9 holds user data, user roles, user devices, user device 
statuses, user device Google Cloud Messaging tokens and user certificates. Regarding au-
thentication and signing, the requests and results of authentication and signing, are also 
stored in MySQL database for better observation and debugging. In future development, 
authentication and signing requests and responses can be stored in memory cache based 
databases and final results can be added to relational database and not overloading the da-
tabase. The full model of the NFC security prototype solution database is described in 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Server application data model 
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3.4 Security 
Mobile Device Verification 
During registration, the web application collects all possible data from the Android build 
file and sends it to the web application. Based on that data, a unique set of data is selected 
(data that will not change during device updates etc.) and based on this data, the applica-
tion calculates user device fingerprint. The fingerprint is calculated based on 4 unique and 
unchangeable values, using device IMEI10, serial, display and MAC11 values. Fingerprint 
calculation is based on SHA-512 hash and byte array XOR. Fingerprint is used as Base64 
string [31]. Algorithm solution code sample is described below. 
 
String getDeviceFingerprintFromDevice(UserDevice device) { 
   MessageDigest mda = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-512"); 
   byte[] deviceBytes = mda.digest(device.imei.getBytes()); 
   byte[] tempBytes = mda.digest(device.mac.getBytes()); 
   deviceBytes = xorByteArrays(deviceBytes, tempBytes); 
   tempBytes = mda.digest(device.screenResolution.getBytes()); 
   deviceBytes = xorByteArrays(deviceBytes, tempBytes); 
   tempBytes = mda.digest(device.serial.getBytes()); 
   deviceBytes = xorByteArrays(deviceBytes, tempBytes); 
   byte[] encodedBytes = Base64.encodeBase64(deviceBytes); 
   return new String(encodedBytes); 
} 
 
This device fingerprint is the unique identification token for the users device during au-
thentication and signing. Each time an authentication response is received, additional de-
vice data is received and fingerprint is calculated to make sure, the response is coming 
from a correct device. If the device fingerprint does not match to the customer allowed 
device fingerprint, authentication/signing will fail on the server side and the user will not 
be granted access.  
Verify Authentication 
In the prototyping phase, the authentication verification works similar to the signature ver-
ification of the user (described in section 3.4.3). User authenticates himself/herself via 
NFC card by simply signing a pre-generated hash with authentication certificate located 
on the NFC card. Public authentication certificate can also be extracted from the NFC card 
with simple APDU calls (described in Appendix 1). Private key of authentication certifi-
cate is pre-personalized into NFC card and can only be changed with master key that is 
kept secret from users. Therefore in order to authenticate, user must remember the PIN1 
passphrase verified by the NFC card and after verification (security level changed in NFC 
card), user can encrypt web application generated hash with the authentication private key 
using RSA encryption algorithm (described in section 2.3.1 of this thesis). After encryp-
tion, the web application verifies the encryption with user public authentication certificate 
(pre-entered into web application) and if there is a match, the user gets authenticated into 
web application. 
 
UserCertificates certs = authenticationReq.user.certificates.first(); 
CertificateFactory certFactory = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509"); 
InputStream inps = new 
ByteArrayInputStream(certs.authorizationPublicCertificate); 
X509Certificate cert = (X509Certificate) certFactory.generateCertificate(inps); 
                                                
10 http://www.imei.info/ 
11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MAC_address 
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Security.addProvider(new BouncyCastleProvider()); 
Cipher asymmetricCipher = Cipher.getInstance("RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding", "BC"); 
asymmetricCipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, cert.getPublicKey()); 
byte[] decrypted = asymmetricCipher.doFinal(encryptedHashBytesArr); 
if(originalHashByteArray.encodeAsHex() == decrypted.encodeAsHex()) { 
   return true; 
} 
return false; 
 
For authentication, Grails uses Java security libraries and embedded BouncyCastle12 secu-
rity provider, RSA algorithm with ECB (Electronic codebook) cipher block mode [30] and 
PKCS1Padding for encrypted data padding. First a user authorization public certificate 
byte array is received from the database and generated into X509Certificate Java class, 
implementing certificate functionality. A security provider RSA decrypt is executed with 
user public key taken from the certificate and decrypted byte array is received. In order to 
do fast comparison between original hash byte array and decrypted hash byte array, the 
arrays are encoded to HEX13 string and then compared. If the original hash HEX string 
matches the decrypted hash HEX string, the authentication has been successful. Depend-
ing on whether the authentication has been successful or not, a Boolean value “false” or 
“true” is returned accordingly. 
Verify Signature 
In order to sign an action, task or a dataset made in the web application, a hash must be 
generated from the data that is about to be signed and a signing request must be sent to the 
mobile application. Mobile application authenticated the user with a PIN2 passphrase and 
by doing that the security level of the Java Card applet is changed to signing. After suc-
cessful user verification, hash received from web application is signed using users signing 
private key stored in NFC card memory (APDU calls described in Appendix 1). After the 
hash has been signed, it is returned to the web application, where the signed hash is veri-
fied using users public signing certificate, pre-entered into the web application. If the sig-
natures match, the user’s signing process was successful. Signature verification is handled 
with RSA public and private key cryptography (described in section 2.3.1 of this thesis). 
Signature verification is handled using the Java security implementation, included in the 
Java Development Kit. 
 
UserCertificates certs = authenticationReq.user.certificates.first(); 
CertificateFactory certFactory = CertificateFactory.getInstance("X.509"); 
InputStream inps = new ByteArrayInputStream(certs.signingPublicCertificate); 
X509Certificate cert = (X509Certificate) certFactory.generateCertificate(inps); 
Security.addProvider(new BouncyCastleProvider()); 
Cipher asymmetricCipher = Cipher.getInstance("RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding", "BC"); 
asymmetricCipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, cert.getPublicKey()); 
byte[] decrypted = asymmetricCipher.doFinal(encryptedHashBytesArr); 
if(originalHashByteArray.encodeAsHex() == decrypted.encodeAsHex()) { 
   return true; 
} 
return false; 
 
For signing, Grails uses Java security libraries and embedded BouncyCastle security pro-
vider, RSA algorithm with ECB (Electronic codebook) cipher block mode [30] and 
PKCS1Padding for encrypted data padding. First a user signing public certificate byte ar-
ray is requested from database and generated into X509Certificate Java class, implement-
                                                
12 https://www.bouncycastle.org/ 
13 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hex 
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ing certificate functionality. A security provider RSA decrypt is executed with the user’s 
public key taken from certificate and decrypted byte array is received. In order to do fast 
comparison between original hash byte array and decrypted hash byte array, the arrays are 
encoded to HEX string and then compared. If the original hash HEX string matches the 
decrypted hash HEX string, the authentication has been successful. Depending on whether 
the authentication has been successful or not a Boolean value false or true is returned ac-
cordingly. 
Security Between NFC Card and Reader 
Security between the NFC card and the NFC card reader (embedded into mobile device) is 
not secured in the first prototype iteration. During prototype phase, we are relying on NFC 
channel security and the fact that this solution is using one active and one passive device 
for NFC communication, therefore the NFC attack area is quite small and the attack can 
affect only one person personally, not the whole user base. As described in section 2.2 of 
this thesis, we can assume that NFC is open to neither Man-In-The-Middle nor eavesdrop-
ping attacks, therefore the passphrases are not easy to obtain. The most likely type of at-
tack is data corruption that only prevents user from logging into desired web application, 
as data is corrupted during transmission between Java Card and NFC reader. It is possible 
to use a shared secret encryption on NFC communication further described in section 2.3 
of this thesis this would make the NFC connection secure and resilient to all possible 
passphrase attacks. 
Security Between Device and Web Server 
The communication between the device and the application server is secured with an 
HTTPS14 connection using TLS 1.2 and a one-way certificate authentication [23]. Server 
is using a trusted certificate authority issued certificate and Android mobile device has this 
server certificate authority added to trusted CA15 list in Android KeyStore16. TLS secure 
connection flow is described in Figure 10. 
During the TLS connection establishing, server exchanges public certificate to client. Do-
ing so, the client can verify that the connecting party is who he claims to be by verifying 
                                                
14 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTPS 
15 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority 
16 http://developer.android.com/reference/java/security/KeyStore.html 
 
Figure 10. TLS handshake model 
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encrypted byte arrays with public key received from certificate. Both sides must have 
knowledge of trusted certificates and allowed connections. After the client verifies the 
server and keys have been exchanged, a unique session key is generated and shared. All 
future communication is encrypted with this key.  
3.5 Application Flow 
Given NFC security solution has multiple flows that need to be handled separately. To 
start with, the user first needs to have an account in given web application - a prerequisite 
to start NFC authentication flow. Web application must have prior knowledge of users 
authentication and signing certificate public keys and need to know the username and 
passphrase of the user. If the prerequisites are handled, the user can enter the NFC security 
authentication application and it’s flows. To start with, user must authenticate the device 
with given web application. To do so, the user must pass the Authorize device phase de-
scribed in section 3.5.1 in this thesis. After successfully passing device authorization, user 
can then authenticate himself/herself with the mobile application or sign web application 
actions using given mobile applications. Authentication- and Signing phase of the NFC 
security solution are described in section 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 of this thesis. Final phase that is 
directly related to using proposed NFC solution mobile application and NFC card is unau-
thorize device phase, where the user unauthorizes device from web application. 
Authorise Device Flow 
In order to authorize the device, the user’s device must first obtain a GCM device key and 
store it in device application local storage. This key is received on the first startup of the 
mobile application and is removed together with application uninstall. A new key is ob-
tained after application reinstall. After the mobile application has received the GCM key, a 
device verification call is made to web application in order to verify (described in Appen-
dix 4), if device is already activated by some user or not. If the device is not registered by 
any user - user can authorize this device as his/her authentication endpoint.  
 
In order to authorize a device the user must enter their username and password, within the 
main view of the android application (described in Appendix 3), to authenticate him-
self/herself and register a new mobile device to the web application as an authentication 
device. After user has finished entering the username and passphrase, the application gen-
erates SHA-512 hash from user entered password and encodes it into Base64 string. After 
the hashing has finished, username, password hash Base64 string, GCM key and device 
data is sent to web application (API call described in Appendix 4). Full authentication 
flow is described in Figure 11. 
 
If device authorization has been successful, device is added to users allowed device list 
and user can now use this device to authenticate himself/herself within the web applica-
tion. If user has used this device before, then already existing device is reactivated as a 
valid authentication endpoint for the user. One device can be linked with only one user at a 
time. In order to use this device as an authentication point for another user, the user must 
first unauthorized the device (described in section 3.5 of this thesis) and the reauthorize 
the device as their device. 
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Figure 11. Device authorisation flow 
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Authentication flow 
To authenticate the user using the proposed NFC authentication solution, user must first 
try to login to web application. Upon arrival to web application user gets redirected to log-
in page, where user must enter his/hers username and passphrase. After the sign-in button 
has been pressed, the web application first validates user username and password and if 
they are correct, it displays user the list of authenticated devices that can be used for NFC 
second layer authentication. At this point user must select a proper device – a device that 
he/she has switched on and connected to the network. After user has selected a device 
used for authentication, server generates a random SHA-512 hash and sends this hash to 
the selected mobile device via GCM service and waits for an answer from the device 
(maximum wait time is configurable, but is 120 seconds for prototype). At this point the 
authentication responsibility is delegated to the mobile device and the NFC Java Card. 
 
When the mobile device receives an authentication request from server, the request is de-
livered to proper mobile application (NFC authentication application in this case) using 
BroadcastReceiver17 and notification intents. A new Intent launches the NFC authentica-
tion application with authentication dialog box. While this dialog is open, user must pair 
his/hers device with NFC card – pairing is successful, when PIN1 retry counter is dis-
played to user. After successful pairing, user must enter PIN1 (distributed together with 
user personalized Java Cards) in order to log into web application. After user has entered 
PIN1 into dialog screen, authentication is handed over to Java Card application. 
 
Mobile application uses an NFC card and authentication APDUs (described in Appendix 
1) to encrypt the hash received from server with user authentication private key located 
inside NFC card. After hash signing is successful, mobile device sends back signed hash 
and original hash to server (using API call described in Appendix 4). The server validates 
the received hash against the users authentication public key (described in section 3.4 of 
this thesis) and if they match, then user gets authenticated and logged into web applica-
tion. Detailed user authentication flow is described in Figure 12.  
                                                
17 http://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/BroadcastReceiver.html 
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Figure 12. Authentication flow 
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Signing flow 
Signing flow is used to add an additional security verification to user tasks or activities 
within web application. Signing is used to maintain the integrity of the data (signed data 
can be validated, if someone has changed it or not) and to add an electronically proven 
signature, that this data has been authorized and validated by given user. This enables the 
web application to require signing from users to ensure the user is aware of the action and 
to tie this action with a certain user. Signing is relying on the fact, that the NFC card is 
accessible only for this given user and therefore this signature has the same effect as a 
written signature. 
 
In order to start signing process, web application must require authorized user to select a 
signing device from the list of authorized user devices or use a device that was used to 
authenticate the given session he/she is using. When user has selected a device / web ap-
plication has identified the authentication device used previously to authenticate the user, 
web application must calculate signing hash over all the data about to be signed. NFC pro-
totype is using SHA-1 hash and hash byte array XOR to generate hash over all the fields if 
there is more than one field to be signed.  In case there is only one field of data to be 
signed, web application will use SHA1 hash of this field as signing hash. 
 
After general data signature hash has been calculated, web application sends hash together 
with signing request to user device via GCM service. User device receives a signing re-
quest via BroadcastReceiver and creates a new Intent launching the mobile application and 
shows a signing dialog to the user. While this dialog is open, user must pair his/hers de-
vice with NFC card pairing is successful, when PIN2 retry counter is displayed to user. 
After successful pairing, user must enter PIN2 of NFC authentication in order to sign the 
received data. After user has entered PIN2 into dialog screen, mobile application gives the 
signing over to NFC Java Card.  
 
NFC card uses APDU’s (described in Appendix 1.) to sign the hash received from server 
with user signing private key located inside NFC card. After hash signing is successful, 
mobile device sends signed hash and original hash back to server (using API call de-
scribed in Appendix 4.), where server validates the received hash against user signing pub-
lic key (described in section 3.4 of this thesis) and if they match, signing has been success-
ful and signature is added to data/task. Signing flow is described in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Signing flow 
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Unauthorize Device Flow 
Unauthorization of user device enables user to remove certain mobile device from allowed 
authorized device list by simply using NFC security mobile application. If user has unau-
thorized his/her device, they can later authorize it again and start using this device as an 
authorization endpoint for NFC security solutions.  
 
In order to unauthorized a user’s device, the device must first be authorized within the web 
application. This is verified via a device verification call (API call described in Appendix 
4) and if the device is authorized to some user, username of this user is displayed within 
mobile application (described in Appendix 3). If user device is authorized and in order to 
unauthorize it, user must open mobile application and press unauthorize device button and 
confirm the unauthorization (described in Appendix 3). After the button click, mobile ap-
plication makes an HTTPS connection to web application and sends a device unauthoriza-
tion call, containing device data and GCM token (API call described in Appendix 4).  
 
After user has unauthorized the device, this device can no longer be used for authentica-
tion or signing and it is not displayed as a login option for user. Device unauthorization 
flow is described in Figure 14.  
44 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Unauthorize device flow 
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3.6 Future Opportunities 
Author proposed NFC security solution for web application could be applied to solve mul-
tiple different authentication problems. Same solution, but with some additional develop-
ment, can be easily converted into Mobile TFA, NO passwords solution, NFC card reader 
etc. All these solutions are enabled by the complex nature of the dual interface Java Card, 
enabling both contacted and contactless connection with same Java Card applet. Combin-
ing NFC card with Estonian ID card would open yet another possible future development 
direction, by enabling EstEID communication via NFC card reader and mobile device. 
This would allow full EstEID capabilities in mobile device without any extra ID card 
reader necessary. Possibilities for future development seem endless, therefore there is a 
need to narrow down the possibilities and thoroughly examine the more beneficial solu-
tions.  
Mobile Two-Factor-Authentication 
As mobile is becoming a more and more independent device, enabling user to manage all 
necessary task using only his/her mobile device, the need for mobile security is on an 
uprise. Mobile device is an excellent second point of authentication device for TFA, but as 
mobile is turning into the main device, there is a need for another authentication point to 
rely on - to provide TFA on mobiles. Here is where NFC security offers an excellent 
solution with no additional development. Proposed NFC solution enables very hard to 
break two factor authentication for mobile devices, by using NFC smartcard as second 
authentication device for users. Mobile phones have direct communication capabilities 
(NFC reader integrated into most smartphones since 2006) [24] with NFC smartcards, no 
additional hardware or development is needed. Mobile application simply connects to 
NFC card, whenever a TFA authentication is needed and authenticates the user via an 
NFC card similar to the proposed NFC security solution for web application. Mobile TFA 
flow is described in Figure 15. where step 1 starts with authentication to mobile 
application, after what, in step 2 NFC PIN1 authentication request is generated to NFC 
authentication Android app (or NFC authentication embedded into an authorized 
application). User authenticates himself/herself with NFC card integrated PIN1 passphrase 
and system verifies authentication similar to section 3.4 of this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 15. TFA from mobile devices 
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Proposed solution for web applications can be improved and converted into mobile TFA 
with ease. As mobile applications communicate with server via API calls, authentication 
can be provided for mobile application instead of web application.  
Corporate Security 
Corporations could create their own NFC security cards that would enable users to access 
through different NFC enabled doors, but also use this card as a main authentication token 
for company systems, by forcing user to authenticate themselves via PIN codes and NFC 
cards for all corporate systems. As NFC cards hold user certificates, these certificates can 
be used for multiple purposes (VPN, Authentication etc.). Additional authentication can be 
requested via signing request, if user wants to access higher security areas or accept some 
tasks that need additional verification. All user decisions and actions within corporate sys-
tem can be signed using an NFC card and user mobile device.  
No Passwords Solution 
User can have multiple accesses to different solution by using only one personalized NFC 
card that has been issued to him/her. All solutions can be combined into using the same 
NFC authentication solution and the user does not need to remember all different login 
usernames and passwords. User can simply authenticate himself/herself via single PIN 
stored in NFC card. Creating a new system requiring a user authentication is also easier, as 
during development, developers can use pre made solutions to integrate with NFC security 
solution for web applications, removing the need to handle usernames and password with-
in the system.  
EstEID NFC Mobile Reader 
Proposed solution can be converted into EstEID NFC authentication solution, by simply 
enabling NFC on Estonian ID card. This would give users the capability of using their 
personal ID cards as additional authentication endpoints for mobile applications together 
with web applications and it also enables the use of mobile device as an ID card reader, 
disabling the need for separate ID card reader. It also adds an additional security layer on 
top of EstEID authentication, as mobile device as a reader, can also be identified and 
traced during authentication. It is possible to enable only some user devices to be allowed 
as NFC card readers. By doing that, the user has full control over what devices can and 
cannot be used to authenticate via NFC. EstEID can also add a possibility for the user to 
decide if NFC authentication is allowed or not with certain ID card, therefore disabling 
NFC attacks while NFC authentication is not used as a means of authentication. Also the 
list of APDU’s enabled (APDU’s described in appendix 1) via NFC interface can be lim-
ited to only the needed APDU’s for authentication. PIN change and more secure APDU’s 
can be enabled for contact interface only. By using these precautions, it is safe to say, that 
Estonian ID card with an NFC interface would be secure and safe to use as a main identi-
fication for Estonian citizens and e-residents. 
 
This proposed solution would also change the authentication flow of the proposed proto-
type, by enabling TLS connection setup via NFC card (similar to working Estonian ID 
solution). Authentication would simply start a TLS connection where client certificate is 
needed and when client certificate request is received from the web application, client 
computer (used to access web application) picks up the request and forwards it to the user-
selected mobile device. Mobile device then acts as an Estonian ID card reader and enables 
all ID card actions via NFC. Behind the scenes, mobile application sends back user public 
authentication certificate and signed TLS handshake hash to users computer and then user 
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browser will get full TLS authentication. Only restriction to this solution is, that user mo-
bile device and user computer must be in the same private network (Wi-Fi, Ethernet or 
hotspot created with mobile device) 
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4 Conclusions 
In conclusion, NFC security has proven to be secure enough to handle user authentication 
and signing via mobile phone and an internet connection. NFC can also be made more 
secure, by using a secure channel communication within the NFC communication relying 
on a shared secret to encrypt the communication data moving between the two devices. As 
author proposed solution is using one active device (mobile phone) and one passive device 
(dual interface NFC Java Card), the possible attack vector of NFC connection is reduced 
to eavesdropping and data corruption - the communication can be eavesdropped or 
disruped within a small distance of the card itself. Adding additional APDU whitelisting to 
the Java Card APDU adds another security feature, enabling administrative actions of the 
card to be managed only via contacted interface. By enabling a secure channel between 
device and NFC card, plus adding whitelist to the Java Card applet, it is safe to claim that 
the proposed NFC solution device to Java Card communication is completely secure. 
Communication between mobile device and web application is ensured by TLS 1.2 
cryptographic protocol and must also be considered as a secure channel between both 
endpoints. Taking into account all the security features added to the solution, the security 
of the solution is proven to be highly secured. 
The author’s proposed solution relies on the analysis made within this thesis to claim that 
NFC authentication solution for web applications can be created securely and can be used 
to authenticate user within web application, or sign user’s activities using mobile device 
NFC. Prototype has proven the concept of how the solution should work and enables 
successful authentication and signing within created web application. Prototype has both 
dual password solution, where user authenticated himself/herself first with web application 
passcode and then via proposed NFC solution to get authenticated into web application 
and no passwords solution, where user simply enters their username and selects a device to 
authenticate himself/herself with. Both solutions work as described and prove the validity 
of the proposed solution. Author proposed NFC authentication has huge pottential to 
become a two-factor authentication endpoint for mobile only solutions and has the 
possibility to use NFC enabled Estonian ID cards as authentication devices. Additionally, 
author proposed solution adds another level of security to already existing pile of security 
solutions, enabling new solutions to be built on top of the given solution. 
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Appendix 
I. Java Card Application APDU’s 
Abstract: Appendix 1 describes APDUs sent via IsoDep protocol within mobile applica-
tion in order to provide authentication functionality to web application. This APDU list is 
based on Estonian ID card possible commands list and provides exactly the same func-
tionality as EstEID card does via contacted interface. 
 
1. Read PIN retry counters 
1.1. Select Master File directory 
CLA INS P1 P2 Le 
00 A4 00 0C 00 
 
1.2. Select counter file 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data 
00 A4 02 0C 02 0016 
 
1.3. Read counters 
PIN1 counter 
CLA INS P1 P2 Le 
00 B2 01 04 00 
PIN2 counter 
CLA INS P1 P2 Le 
00 B2 02 04 00 
PUK counter 
CLA INS P1 P2 Le 
00 B2 03 04 00 
 
2. Read certificates 
2.1. Select Master File directory 
CLA INS P1 P2 Le 
00 A4 00 0C 00 
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2.2. Select EEEE file 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data 
00 A4 01 04 02 EEEE 
 
2.3. Select certificate 
Authentication certificate 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data 
00 A4 02 04 02 AACE 
Digital signature certificate 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data 
00 A4 02 04 02 DDCE 
 
2.4. Read certificate 
CLA INS P1 P2 Le 
00 B0 01 - FF 00 00 
 
 
3. Verify PIN1 
3.1. Select Master File directory 
CLA INS P1 P2 Le 
00 A4 00 0C 00 
 
3.2. Select EEE file 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data 
00 A4 01 04 02 EEEE 
 
3.3. Set Security environment 
CLA INS P1 P2 Le 
00 22 F3 01 00 
 
3.4. Verify PIN1 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data(PIN1 as ASCII) 
00 20 00 01 04 31323334 
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4. Sign hash using PIN1  
PIN1 verification (described in section 3 of Appendix 1) required before executing this 
APDU 
 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
00 88 00 00 Hash array length Hash array 00 
 
5. Verify PIN2 
5.1. Select Master File directory 
CLA INS P1 P2 Le 
00 A4 00 0C 00 
 
5.2. Select EEEE file 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data 
00 A4 01 04 02 EEEE 
 
5.3. Set security environment 
CLA INS P1 P2 Le 
00 22 F3 01 00 
 
5.4. verify PIN2 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data(PIN2 as ASCII) 
00 20 00 02 05 3132333435 
 
6. Sign hash using PIN2 
PIN2 verification (described in section 5 of Appendix 1) required before executing this 
APDU 
 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
00 2A 9E 9A Hash array length Hash array 00 
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II. Cryptographic Algorithm Benchmarking 
Abstract: Appendix 2 describes different cryptographic algorithm speeds and compared 
them with each other. Main focus is comparing symmetric and asymmetric cryptography 
algorithms, with different key and block sizes and to identify the best suitable crypto-
graphic algorithms for NFC security solution proposed in this thesis. 
 
Hardware used for testing cryptography speeds 
Operating system OS X Yosemite 
Processor 2.2 GHz Intel core I7 
Memory 16 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 
Graphics Intel Iris Pro 1536 MB 
 
Performance analysis done using OpenSSL built in speed testing tools, with minimized 
operating system load on the hardware. 
 
Hash generation 
 
Block size SHA1 
(Hash/s) 
SHA256 
(Hash/s) 
SHA512 
(Hash/s) 
MD5 
(Hash/s) 
16 2927071.3 1939447.3 1453248.7 2619817.3 
64 2051071.3 1168507.0 1451481 2002429 
256 1161599.7 552187.7 666911.7 1077459 
1024 416352.3 171633.7 258243 365903.7 
2048 57689.7 22411.7 37263 52981 
 
Symmetric Encryption algorithms 
 
Block size 3DES (Enc/s) DES (Enc/s) AES128 
(Enc/s) 
AES192 
(Enc/s) 
AES256 
(Enc/s) 
16 1724741.7 4482440 8488211.7 7102791 6279469.3 
64 419486 1113314.3 2141398 1897358 1722419.7 
256 109878.7 273940 535701 451289.3 434633 
1024 27567.3 67393.3 138249 112720.7 108602.7 
2048 3465 8492.7 16524 14815 13540.3 
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Asymmetric Encryption algorithms 
 
RSA 
 
Key size (bit)  RSA (Sign/s) RSA (Veri-
fy/s) 
512 7334.6 101908.4 
1024 2099.3   43349.3 
2048 397.3 15873.5 
4096 64.9 4708.0 
 
Elliptic Curve 
 
Key size (bit)  EC (Sign/s) EC (Verify/s) 
160 9483.5 2155.7 
192 9186.5 2138.2 
224 6317.7    1432.6 
256 5132.4    1158.6 
384 2660.7     552.0 
512 2453.6     504.5 
571 142.0      69.5 
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III. NFC Security Solution for Web Application Prototype 
Abstract: Appendix 3 describes the different user activity flows within NFC security so-
lution for web application prototype. 5 different flows - device authorization, user authori-
zation, signing, device unauthorisation and NFC card test are described with visual aids 
from web application and mobile application. 
 
1. Device authorization 
Start NFC mobile application for the first time on a new device (unauthorized device) 
 
 
 
Fill in server username and password (needed to authenticate user for web application) 
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Press register device button, to authenticate this device as you NFC authentication end-
point 
 
Your device has been successfully authenticated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. User authorization 
 
 
Open web application and authenticate user with username and password 
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After successful username and password authentication, user gets redirected to select NFC 
authentication device page, where user must select one device to authenticate with. 
 
 
 
When user has selected the NFC authentication device, an authentication request is sent to 
selected device via GCM service. 
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New authentication request is shown to user (Requiring user to authenticate him-
self/herself using NFC card and PIN1 passphrase). 
 
 
 
User must fill in the PIN1 passphrase with 4 digits, matching the personalized PIN1 on the 
NFC card. 
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User authentication was successful, and user can continue to using the web application 
 
 
 
After user has agreed to continue, he/she gets redirected to main page of the web applica-
tion 
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3. Signing 
 
 
 
In order to start signing prototype, user must open signing demo view 
 
 
User must enter the text phrase he/she wants to sign and press “Sign” button 
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A new signing request is forwarded to user authenticated mobile device (same device used 
in authentication flow) via GCM service. 
 
A new signing request is received in user mobile device and signing flow has been started 
in NFC mobile application 
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User must fill in the PIN2 passphrase, matching the PIN2 passphrase personalized into 
NFC card. 
 
 
 
Signing has succeeded and signing request is closed. 
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Signing response is received by web application and the result is displayed to the user.  
 
4. Device unauthorisation 
 
In order to authorize the device, user must open the NFC application in mobile device and 
press “Unauthorise device” button 
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Unauthorisation verification is requested from the user. If the user decides to unauthorize 
the device, then after pressing the “YES” button, the device gets unauthorized. 
 
 
When device is unauthorized, it opens the possibility to register the device again with web 
application username and password. 
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5. NFC card test 
 
 
To test the NFC connection, there is the possibility to open NFC mobile application and 
simply pair the device with NFC card. If connection is successful, NFC card personalized 
first name, last name, PIN1 retry count and PIN2 retry count is displayed. 
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IV. Rest API calls 
Challenge 
name 
Direction Part Value 
1. Verify device POST URL https://localhost:8080/api/verify-device 
  JSON { 
    device_key: “ewjoi4jio4j34oij4oi34jo3j43o5j35”, 
    device:{ 
        osversion:"test",  
        release:"test",       
        device":"test",  
        model:"test", 
        product:"test", 
        brand:"test",     
        display:"test", 
        cpuabi:"test",  
        unknown:"test",  
        hardware:"test", 
        buildid:"test",  
        manufacturer:"test", 
        serial:"test",  
        deviceuser:"test", 
        host:"test",    
        imei:"test",        
        imsi:"test",   
        numberline1:"37255526262", 
        mac:"test",      
        screen" :"345x345",        
        androidid:"test",     
        deviceid":"test", 
    }         
} 
 GET JSON { 
    status:”OK” or “NOK”, 
    message: 1-8, 
    username: “jonas” 
} 
2. Add device POST URL https://localhost:8080/api/add-device 
  JSON { 
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    device_key: “ewjoi4jio4j34oij4oi34jo3j43o5j35”, 
    username: “jonas”, 
    device:{ 
        osversion:"test",  
        release:"test",       
        device":"test",  
        model:"test", 
        product:"test", 
        brand:"test",     
        display:"test", 
        cpuabi:"test",  
        unknown:"test",  
        hardware:"test", 
        buildid:"test",  
        manufacturer:"test", 
        serial:"test",  
        deviceuser:"test", 
        host:"test",    
        imei:"test",        
        imsi:"test",   
        numberline1:"37255526262", 
        mac:"test",      
        screen" :"345x345",        
        androidid:"test",     
        deviceid":"test", 
    }         
} 
 GET JSON { 
    status:”OK” or “NOK”, 
    message: 1-8, 
    username: “jonas” 
} 
3. Unauthorize 
device 
POST URL https://localhost:8080/api/unauthorize-device 
  JSON { 
    device:{ 
        osversion:"test",  
        release:"test",       
        device":"test",  
        model:"test", 
        product:"test", 
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        brand:"test",     
        display:"test", 
        cpuabi:"test",  
        unknown:"test",  
        hardware:"test", 
        buildid:"test",  
        manufacturer:"test", 
        serial:"test",  
        deviceuser:"test", 
        host:"test",    
        imei:"test",        
        imsi:"test",   
        numberline1:"37255526262", 
        mac:"test",      
        screen" :"345x345",        
        androidid:"test",     
        deviceid":"test", 
    }         
} 
 GET JSON { 
    status:”OK” or “NOK”, 
    message: 1-8, 
    username: “jonas” 
} 
4. 
Authentication 
result 
POST URL https://localhost:8080/api/authentication-result 
 
  JSON { 
    username: “jonas”, 
    original_hash:”Base64 generated hash”, 
    encrypted_hash:”Base64 encrypted hash” 
} 
 GET JSON { 
    status:”OK” or “NOK”, 
    message: 1-8, 
    username: “jonas” 
} 
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5. Sign result POST URL https://localhost:8080/api/sign-response 
  JSON { 
    username: “jonas”, 
    original_hash:”Base64 generated hash”, 
    encrypted_hash:”Base64 encrypted hash” 
} 
 GET JSON { 
    status:”OK” or “NOK”, 
    message: 1-8, 
    username: “jonas” 
} 
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VI. Source code 
The source code of the NFC web application solution can be downloaded from bitbucket 
git repository  https://username@bitbucket.org/jonx/nfc-grails.git 
The source code of the Android application can be downloaded from bitbucket git 
repository https://username@bitbucket.org/jonx/nfc-android.git 
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